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Review Essay

The First Amendment's Biggest Threat
Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law To
Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity.By Lawrence
Lessig, The Penguin Press, 2004.
The Creation of the Media: PoliticalOrigins of Modern
Communications. By Paul Starr, Basic Books, 2004.

Reviewed by Michael J. Gerhardtt
The biggest threat to freedom of speech and of the press in
the United States may be different than you imagine. For
many, if not most, people, the biggest threat to the First
Amendment' comes from the government. Federal and state
government officials have a long history of using their respective powers to silence their critics. For other people, factions interested in consolidating their political power are the most serious threat to the First Amendment. For many others, the
American public poses the most serious threat to the First
Amendment. Many Americans find a good deal of expression
offensive, and many are hostile to opinions different from their
own.
In two new books, Stanford Law School Professor Lawrence Lessig and Princeton Sociologist Paul Starr suggest that
one of the gravest threats-if not the most serious threat-to
the First Amendment may stem from a different source. In
their judgment, this threat comes not from the federal governt Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Minnesota Law School (Fall 2004). I am grateful
to David Anderson, Deborah R. Gerhardt, and Bill Marshall for helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Brian Flaherty and Laura Weeks for valuable
research assistance.

1. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that the "Congress
shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
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ment or the American people, but rather, from the unique control over the media by a few large corporations. In Free Culture:
How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law To Lock Down
Culture and Control Creativity,2 Lessig argues that the small

number of corporations controlling the media is stifling creative
expression. In particular, he argues that the convergence of
three factors-changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology-has produced a "permission culture" dominated by only a few businesses. 3 This change necessitates "adjustments" in copyright law to "restore the balance that has
traditionally defined" the relationship between the legal protections of creative property and the ability of anyone to engage in
unfettered creativity. 4 In The Creation of the Media: Political
Origins of Modern Communications,5 Starr claims that the
ownership of the media by only a few companies spells serious
trouble for the freedom of the press. This arrangement, he argues, is likely to culminate in a lack of diversity in programming, resulting in the expression of fewer viewpoints in the national media. Even worse, the enormous costs of entry into the
national media ownership market leave the power in this market to relatively few businesses. 6 The latter are then driven by
the need to maintain their market share and stifle competition
rather than maintain high standards of news reporting. While
acknowledging that the structure of modern mass communications is largely a function of policy choices, Starr worries that
be exundoing these choices and making better ones may
7
tremely difficult at best if not completely impossible.
Thus, for both Lessig and Starr, a major problem in contemporary America is that a few large corporations generally
control the media. These corporations are disposed to use their
market power to stifle competition, to maximize their profits, to
receive favorable treatment from political leaders beholden to
them, and to stop the free flow of ideas. The danger of this phenomenon is that big business wants to shape the news to suit

2. LAWRENCE
TECHNOLOGY AND

BIG MEDIA USES
FREE CULTURE: How
LESSIG,
THE LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL

CREATIVITY (2004).
3. Id. at xiv-xv.

4. Id. at 261.
5.

PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF

MODERN COMMUNICATIONS (2004).
6. See id. at 399.
7. See id. at 401-02.

1800

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:1798

its own ends rather than to facilitate the ideal of freedom of the
press. Corporate dominance of the media poses a serious threat
to the values the First Amendment was supposedly designed to
foster-from promoting a marketplace of ideas to serving as a
check on governmental abuse.
In this Review Essay, I examine Lessig's and Starr's accounts of the threat posed to the First Amendment by the consolidation of corporate ownership of the media in the United
States. After providing a brief overview of both books in Part I,
I compare and contrast the case each author makes to support
his perception of the threat big business poses to the First
Amendment. The showing each author makes must fulfill the
three basic requirements for establishing the existence of a
genuine threat to First Amendment values: (1) the existence of
a harm; (2) a causal relationship between that harm and the
rise of consolidated corporate ownership of the media; and (3) a
demonstration of which institutions should be responsible for
monitoring and alleviating the harm, as well as their relative
ability to adequately do so.
In Part II, I consider the first of these requirements-the
demonstration of actual harm. Starr's meticulous history of the
political origins of the modern media demonstrates far more
convincingly than Lessig's anecdotal evidence the genuine
harm that consolidation of corporate ownership of the media
poses to at least some First Amendment values. Indeed, Starr's
historiography undercuts Lessig's most dramatic claim that
corporate domination of the media is a recent problem. Starr's
historiography suggests such domination is neither novel nor,
as Lessig claims, ever been worse.
Part III compares how well each author demonstrates the
second requirement for demonstrating a threat to the First
Amendment-the link between the rise of corporate media control and the harm it supposedly poses to First Amendment values. The causal connection is purportedly made possible by corporations' arranging for favorable treatment from government
regulators and federal courts. While both accounts increase our
understanding of the complex forces shaping modern mass
communications, neither fully or convincingly demonstrates
that Congress and the Supreme Court are truly captive to corporate interests.
In the final part, I examine the third requirement for
showing actual harm to the First Amendment--demonstrating
which institutions are best situated to monitor and to amelio-
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rate the threat posed by corporate dominance of the national
media. This examination requires exploring both the feasibility
of particular reform proposals and, more basically, the significance of the impact of nonjudicial constitutional activity on
First Amendment values. Interestingly, Lessig's proposed reforms are all addressed to Congress, despite his failure to recognize his mistake in first taking his case against the constitu8
tionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act to the Supreme

Court rather than to Congress. By initially taking his claims to
the federal courts, Lessig unwittingly did what many conservative critics of liberal judicial activism have long condemnedtrying to use the federal courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, to adopt the policies liberals have failed or not taken the
trouble to get Congress or other legislatures to adopt. The odds
of Lessig's convincing Congress to revise the Copyright Extension Act along his suggested lines were never great, but going
to the Court initially almost certainly lessened his chances for
getting a receptive audience in Congress. It is not unreasonable
to imagine he could have found a more receptive audience in
Congress than the Court, for many conservative Republicans
might have been inclined to agree on the need to increase the
market power of individual citizens.
In another recently published book, First Amendment
scholar Geoffrey R. Stone suggests that the most important
way in which to protect First Amendment guarantees is to develop and maintain a national culture committed to the freedoms of speech and of the press. 9 The biggest threat to the First
Amendment may be the absence of the requisite elements and
forces to cultivate a culture dedicated to nurturing and ensuring the nation's fundamental commitments to First Amendment values. One institution, whether it is Congress, the Court,
or a major corporation, can pose a risk to that culture. But it is
not the responsibility of any single institution or segment of society to nurture or sustain that culture. Instead, maintaining
commitment to the First Amendment is a collective social, political, and legal responsibility. We must all rise to meet that
challenge, or collectively suffer the consequences of falling
short.
8. See The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); LESSIG,
supra note 2, at 275.
9. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
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I. THE PROBLEM
The story of the rise of corporate control of the media is not
new. Lessig and Starr tell that story from different perspectives, draw similar but not identical lessons from it, and assess
different institutional responsibilities for ameliorating the First
Amendment threats that concern them.
A. LESSIG'S FREE CULTURE

Lessig is an unabashed member of the so-called "copyright
left," which is dedicated to eliminating, or at least restricting to
a large extent, contemporary copyright protections.1 0 His book
is a brief for his side of a very rich, rather complex debate about
the extent to which the Constitution and other laws protect
copyright. He begins each chapter with an anecdote that drives
home his main point that corporate control of the media threatens creativity because corporations use their superior economic
power to arrange for favorable treatment from the government.
The latter includes increased legal protections for copyright,
which have helped transform our culture from a free one to one
requiring permission at almost every step of the creative process.
Lessig's book consists of four parts with a conclusion and
an afterward. The first part, "Piracy," has five chapters, in
which he describes how intellectual property in our tradition
has been perverted of its original and primary purpose of serving as an instrument to facilitate creativity. In these chapters,
Lessig builds a case for the virtues of creative destruction in
the service of progress. Once upon a time, he notes, if you
owned a plot of land, your rights extended down to the core of
earth beneath your property and up to the heavens.1 When the
airplane came along, however, it became obvious something
had to happen-those rights would have to be curtailed. In
1946, a pair of North Carolina farmers, the Causbys, challenged the government's right to "take" the property between
their land and the heavens for the use of aircraft, leading the
Supreme Court to declare that such an "ancient doctrine" had
"no place in the modern world."1 2 The Supreme Court came

down on the sides of Congress and the future.
10. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at xiv (referring to himself as a member of
the copyright left).
11. Id. at 1.
12. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946).
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As Lessig recounts, the owners of today's entertainment
industry are today's Causbys. He believes
it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the

Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass.13

The danger of allowing the "silliness" of endless extensions of
copyright protection to persist is that "we are allowing those
most threatened by the changes [in copyright law] to use their
power to change the law-and more importantly, to use their
power to change something fundamental about who we always
have been." 14 Lessig believes that until recently we have been a
"free culture," seeking to maintain
a balance between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free
market, is filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and
contract that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is
perverted if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be
queered by extremism in the property rights that define it.15

The danger is that "modern-day equivalents of the early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using
their power to get the law to protect them against" digital technologies that could unfettered (or at least with far fewer constraints)
produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market for building
and cultivating culture; that market could include a much wider and
more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon
earn more on average
a few important factors those creators could
6
from this system than creators do today.'

The problem, for Lessig, is that "the law no longer [draws
the] distinction between republishing someone's work on the
one hand and building upon or transforming that work on the
other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern; copyright law today regulates both."17 He gives various
examples to demonstrate how the "law's role is less and less to
support creativity, and more and more to protect certain industries against competition."18 Today, in his judgment, the law
burdens "an extraordinary range of commercial and noncom13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

LESSIG, supranote 2, at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at xvi.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 19.
Id.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1804

[89:1798

mercial creativity... with insanely complex and vague rules
and with the threat of obscenely severe penalties."'19
Lessig expresses a concern that the "war on piracy" will
change the United States, creating "less and less a free culture,
more and more a permissive culture." 20 To make advancements
in this permissive culture, innovators are constantly forced to
obtain permission from various sources. 21 Large media companies have cultivated this cultural change to consolidate their
power and to make it harder for innovators to create new inventions and interfere with their market share.
In chapter 5, Lessig explores further the role of piracy of
intellectual property. Lessig suggests some forms of piracy are
quite wrong, while others are "useful and productive" in producing new information. 22 He takes a closer look at peer-to-peer
exchanges of music, such as Napster, where it might be illegal
to copy entire copyrighted CDs, but other uses, such as accessing uncopyrighted music, are not prohibited. 2 3 He compares the
development of peer-to-peer with albums, cable television, and
VCRs. 24 According to Lessig, "[iun each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way that content was distributed. In each case, throughout our history, that change
meant that someone got a 'free ride' on someone else's work." 25
Lessig suggests that like the previous technologies, when it
comes to peer-to-peer, courts should wait and let Congress develop a way to balance the interests of the new technology and
26
the established companies.
The second part of Free Culture discusses "Property." With
"few exceptions," Lessig believes "ideas released to the world
are free." 27 Property law historically protected "tangible" property. Today, however, intellectual property law protects "the intangible." 28 In chapter 6, Lessig presents a historical account of
copyright, culminating in a 1774 decision, Donaldson v. Beckett,

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67-69.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

28. Id.

at 70.
at 77.
at 77-79.
at 84.
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that recognized the concept of public domain. 29 The decision affirmed the Parliament's rule limiting copyrights to twenty-one
30
years.
Lessig uses Clint Eastwood as an example in chapters 7, 8,
and 9. Lessig describes the difficulty of a producer's attempt to
make a CD-ROM about Eastwood, having to spend a year
31
tracking down the rights to footage from Eastwood's movies.
These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
lawyers-again a privilege, or perhaps a
process is a process of paying
32
curse, reserved for the few.

Lessig expresses concern that with the increasing ability of

technology to archive and create a media record of the past, issues of determining fair use will become increasingly important.
In chapter 10, Lessig argues against the proposition that
creative property owners should have the same rights as all
other property owners. Lessig counters that the "Progress
Clause" of the Constitution indicates that the Founders never
intended intellectual property owners to have the same rights
as other property owners. 3 3 He argues that enacting legal conan
straints to protect owners of intellectual property will have
34
unwanted effect on the cultural environment of creativity.
Lessig also criticizes the expansion of copyrights to protect
derivative works, as well as the preoccupation of copyright law
with the dangers of copying others' works. 35 This focus indicates the dangerous effect that this expansion has had on the
Internet, which he suggests was never even imagined when
copyright expanded to include copies.3 6 He points to the current
trend of allowing computer programs to enforce copyright law,
stating that these programs often remove the option of fair use
29. Id. at 92; see Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
30. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 92-93.
31. Id. at 102.
32. Id. at 107.
33. Article I of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress
shall have the Power To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter the Progress Clause].
34. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 128-29.
35. Id. at 136-39.
36. Id. at 146-47.
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of many copyrighted materials.3 7 The resulting effect is "[t]he
control of copyright is simply what private owners chose." 38 At
the end of the chapter, he names the fear that led him to this
book: "Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of our culture than now." 39
In chapters 11 and 12, Lessig returns to the availability of
copyrighted music online. He focuses on how online radio has
essentially been chased out of production by the larger media
industries, particularly by recording artists demanding compensation for every song played. 40 He suggests that these new
developments created a situation where "this generation's
buggy manufacturers have already saddled Congress, and are
riding the law to protect themselves against this new form of
competition." 41 Lessig does not fault the recording industry for
trying to preserve or increase their profits, but instead, blames
Congress for failing to see the harm that its copyright laws are
42
causing.
Chapters 13 and 14 examine in detail the case of Eldred v.
Ashcroft.43 In that case, Lessig defended a man who published
online copyrighted poems of Robert Frost that were first published in 1923, and, due to the Copyright Term Extension Act,
would not have their copyright expire until 2018 at the earliest.44 Lessig based his arguments to the Supreme Court on
United States v. Lopez. 45 He argued that the same principle
that limited Congress's power to extend the Commerce Clause
beyond interstate commerce in Lopez should limit its ability to
extend the Progress Clause beyond a fixed period of time. 46 If a
limit were not set by the courts, he argued, then there would be
no "stopping point" to Congress's power.4 7
Eldred lost the case, and Lessig blames himself for the loss.
The Court refused to consider the comparison of the Lopez decision to the Progress Clause, ruling instead that Congress's

37. Id. at 148-52.
38. Id. at 147.
39. Id. at 170.
40. Id. at 195.
41. Id. at 204.
42. See id.
43. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
44. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 213-15.
45. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
46. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 219-20.
47. Id. at 228-30.
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power is not limited in this area. 48 Lessig believes, "[tihere was
no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't
convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed
to show why it was unconstitutional." 49 Lessig miscalculated.
Instead, the Supreme Court rejected his argument because he
failed to persuade a majority of Justices that the harm to creativity was genuine and severe.
As a result of his losing his case in the Supreme Court,
Lessig proposes a series of changes to the current copyright
law. For instance, he proposes allowing a copyright owner after
fifty years to pay a $1 fee and register online to renew the copyright.50 Any copyright owner who did not register his materials
would see the materials enter the public domain until the registration form is completed. 51 Lessig believes that this would
protect copyright owners while allowing access of the public to
52
materials copyright protection does not benefit.
In an afterward to his book, Lessig suggests several other
short- and long-term options for improving the current copyright system. In the short term, Lessig advocates taking a step
away from the extremes. He writes, "What's needed is ... a

way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
they see fit."3 He suggests this could be accomplished by allow-

ing copyright owners to determine the level of rights that they
54
are willing to pass on to others.
Lessig identifies five long-term goals. First, he suggests
creating a registration database for copyrighted material managed by private companies, similar to the companies that manage rights to Web addresses. 55 Currently, there is no database,
the absence of which often adds to the legal difficulties associated with determining copyright ownership. Second, he recommends a system of marking materials to indicate the level of
permission an owner is willing to grant someone who wants to

48. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 ("[The] Copyright Clause empowers Congress
to determine the intellectual property regimes that overall, in that body's
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.").
49. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 230.
50. Id. at 248-49.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 253.
53. Id. at 277.
54. Id. at 282-84.
55. Id. at 288.
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access his work. 56 Third, Lessig advocates changing the current
term of copyrights. 57 While Lessig does not insist on a particular time period, he is adamant that "a term once given should
not be extended."58 Fourth, Lessig would narrow the scope of
derivative rights included in copyrights. 59 When it comes to the
file sharing of music, Lessig favors "regulat[tion] to minimize
the harm to interests affected by this technological change,
while enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology
we can create."60 Finally, he recommends reducing the regulation of culture. He challenges his readers to "[s]how me why
your regulation of culture is needed. Show me how it does good.
61
And until you can show me both, keep your lawyers away."
B. STARR'S MASS MEDIA

Starr provides an interdisciplinary account of the development of American media from the seventeenth to the midtwentieth century. His thesis is that "constitutive choices" during this period created a "material and institutional framework
of communications and information" in which the development
of the "public sphere" was made possible. 62 He suggests that
these decisions fall into one of three categories: the formation of
legal rules regarding free expression of ideas and information;
the design of the communications networks themselves; or the
institutions of human capital, in which education and literacy
are stressed.
According to Starr, modern mass communications owes its
distinctive origins in this country to the primacy of public policy.63 He demonstrates that the development of the media was

not inevitable in either the United States or elsewhere in the
world. Starr's emphasis on public choice is distinctive from the
outset, when he suggests that "the United States has followed a
distinctive developmental path in communications ever since
the American revolution." 64 This path was influenced to some
extent by forces beyond the control of political leaders, such as
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 290.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 306.
STARR, supra note 5, at 4.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 2.
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the absence of guilds and other feudal restraints on commerce;
geopolitical isolation from European conflicts; and a continental
orientation that encouraged the creation of national networks.
But the American path also stemmed from political choices that
reflected the Founders' republican commitments-not simply to
a decentralized free press but also to a strong public sphere
populated by an informed citizenry. 65 This positive conception
of liberty encouraged limited use of state power to promote
communications through such diverse means as cheap postal
rates, postal privacy, public education, and widespread literacy,
as well as widely published constitutions and minutes of legis66
lative meetings.
The first section of Starr's book examines the formation of
"a new public sphere" during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Starr describes how England and France
gradually shifted away from political secrecy as capitalism and
a desire for knowledge fueled a rise in print newspapers. 67 This
rise, however, was still stymied by both governmental use of informal restrictions, such as licensing and taxes, and the Catholic Church's censorship demands. 68 This period was also noteworthy due to some of the sharp differences in the colonies as
New England showed great support for education and its literacy rates far surpassed the more commercially focused Vir69
ginia.
Starr shows how newspapers played an instrumental role
as the press in the debate between the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists. Moreover, he demonstrates that the First
Amendment was at least partly motivated by the desire to protect not only individual rights but also institutions performing
the function of the press. 70 Newspapers began to flourish in the
early nineteenth century in part due to the expansion of the
post office system in the United States, as its low price distribution network allowed many papers to reduce subscription
charges and increase circulation. 71 Daily or "penny" papers
with local news and independents' news-gathering capabilities
began to emerge as well, as technological innovations lowered
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

15.
16.
33-45.
52-53.
75-76.
88-90.
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the cost of printing and made papers affordable to the general
72
public.
The second section of Starr's book details the rise of technological networks between 1840 and 1930. Even though the
telegraph is not part of our modern communications network,
Starr depicts its development in detail because it is an example
of how early constitutive choices became the basis for future
media-developing decisions. 73 Starr describes how Western Union gained prominence through its role in the Civil War, when
its telegraph network carried important military news back
from the front lines.7 4 The Supreme Court was reluctant to interfere with this new technology. In Ex Parte Jackson, the
Court refused to protect privacy rights in telegrams as it had
done under the Fourth Amendment with sealed letters carried
by the post office. 75 Similarly, it was not until 1945 that the
government and the courts cracked down on the wire story monopoly enjoyed by the Associated Press, finally stating that requiring newspapers to enter into exclusive arrangements ille76
gally restrained the trade.
The invention and spread of the telegraph indelibly shaped
the development of the telephone. Due to antitrust concerns,
American companies like Bell could not take advantage of existing telegraph lines like their counterparts in Europe could.
Starr writes that by divorcing the two networks, the United
States actually provided a strong incentive for the telephone to
develop on its own. 77 As a result of significant scientific and

technological research conducted by telephone companies, the
American telephone system was more efficient and far more
diffuse than that in Europe. 78 Antitrust was not the only reason
for American's advantage in communication networks; judicial
decisions guaranteeing free speech and privacy protections led
to trust in communications systems. 79 Access to a large national market fueled the development of communications networks, whereas the Europeans were forced to deal with politically fragmented nations.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 155-65.
Id. at 173.
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1945).
STARR, supra note 5, at 193.
Id. at 194-98.
Id. at 221-22.
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The third and final section of Starr's book is entitled "The
Making of the Modern Media, 1865-1941."80 This period is especially significant because it involved the increasing application of moral regulations to communications. In the late nineteenth century, Congress enacted the Comstock Act, which
criminalized sending obscene material through the mail.8 ' This
wave of censorship did not carry over into the print media, as
magazines and daily papers containing minority political views
became plentiful.8 2 Around the turn of the century, competition
and thus diversity flourished in the print media as there were
relatively few barriers to entering the marketplace.
The First Amendment fared differently in the nineteenth
than in the twentieth century. According to Starr, during the
nineteenth century "no federal court struck down a law based
on the basis of the free-speech protections of the First Amendment,"8 3 but there was little debate about freedom of speech

since there was little government crackdown on dissent. Starr
notes that it was World War I and the subsequent "red scare"
that "provoked the generative crisis of modern First Amendment law."8 4 The leading advocates of free speech during the

early twentieth century were newspapers defending the free
press, conservative libertarian legal scholars, and individual
citizens who formed the first civil libertarian organizations.
Starr observes that the Supreme Court was not eager in
the early twentieth century to combat the censorship and obscenity arrests of the time. In Patterson v. Colorado, for example, the Court ruled that the First Amendment was only a
80. Id. at 231.
81. The Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000). Starr's book is filled with
fascinating data on each era in the evolution of modern mass communications.
In discussing the prominence of censorship at the turn of the century, Starr
explains, for instance, that public libraries evolved in this era as a way of controlling the books that people read. He explains:
The establishment of public libraries, like censorship laws, expressed
a widely felt determination to impose moral direction on a cultural
marketplace thought to be undermining cherished values.... In the
1870s, when the American Library Association was established, its
members saw censorship as their professional responsibility. The
purpose of libraries, in their view, was not entertainment but education and self-improvement, and they selected books accordingly, banning works that they and their governing boards deemed immoral or
sensational.
STARR, supra note 5, at 249-50.
82. STARR, supra note 5, at 250.
83. Id. at 268.
84. Id.
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shield from prior restraints, not from punishment after publication of unprotected speech. 85 Judge Learned Hand stated his
"direct incitement" test in the Masses case,8 6 only to have the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overrule
him and adopt the "bad tendency" test, which was more deferential to government authority.8 7 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, restated the "bad tendency" test using the phrase "clear and present danger."8 8 Justice Holmes did not initially mean for this
test to be more protective, but courts began to use it to uphold
free speech. Eventually even Justice Holmes came around to
this view, defecting from the then-conservative majority on the
Court.8 9 Starr suggests that the judicial reversal on free speech
was apparent in Near v. Minnesota, a 1931 case in which the
Supreme Court struck down a state law that had the purpose
or effect of operating as a prior restraint on the press. 90
Government and the courts also had to decide how censorship and government regulation should apply to emerging new
technologies such as movies and the radio. In 1915, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld movie censorship. 91 The
Court distinguished the movie business from the press and
other organs of public opinion, and also distinguished ideas
from entertainment. 92 Starr concludes that movie censorship
was ineffective, as film production and distribution were so
fragmented as to impede governmental regulation of the movies
93
generally.
The federal government had decided to take a balanced position with respect to the development of the radio, as it retained public ownership of the airwaves but distributed licenses to private companies. Unlike the press or movies, radio
ownership became very concentrated, most likely due to the
limited radio spectrum available for transmission. 94 The Communications Act of 1934 produced the Federal Communications

85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).
See Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
STARR, supra note 5, at 282.
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Mut. Film Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
See id.
STARR, supra note 5, at 296.
Id. at 328-30.
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Commission (FCC), a regulatory commission that had broad
powers to allocate licenses only to broadcasting companies that
were in the public interest. 95 In the 1940s, the FCC took steps
to increase diversity and promote competition; NBC, for example, had to give up its profitable Blue network, which later became ABC. Starr explains that mass media outlets arose partly
had become increasin response to American society, which
96
ingly diverse, urban, and industrial.
Starr concludes his book with a somber warning. In the
1930s, several institutions came together--"a potent but still
decentralized press," the "movie business," and "the world's
only significant commercial broadcast industry"-as "the harbingers of a new era when the media were an independent factor in politics." 97 These institutions were "no less important, for

example, than the political parties that had once held sway
over many of them."9 8 A momentous transformation was under
way in this country's mass communications: from press to media, from print to broadcast journalism, and to an independent
media dominated by only a few major corporations, driven by
commercial interests, and protected by the constitutive choices
that made its ascension possible. This transformation has had
enormous ramifications for the First Amendment post-1941. In
this era, the news media developed differently than the media.
The new mass media "did not receive the same degree of protection from state supervision; control was more highly centralized; and advertising and mass marketing drove [its] content,
particularly in the case of commercial radio in the United
States. The origins of modern communications had been, in
critical respects, liberal and democratic." 99 But
the media developed along lines that were so deeply in tension with
those ideals[.] Could the mass media do the job that democracy classically assigned to the press-or did the commercially driven media and
new techniques of mass persuasion so distort public knowledge and
degrade public discussion as to make popular self-government impossible?100

Starr's answer is not heartening. He expresses doubt that the
political choices that made the transformation of mass media
possible can ever be undone.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (2000); STARR, supra note 5, at 360.
STARR, supra note 5, at 388-95.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id.
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II. DEMONSTRATING A GENUINE HARM TO THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
There are a number of possible threats to the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
The most obvious threat would come from the federal or state
government. It is not unreasonable to fear that government officials have strong incentives to silence or punish their critics
and are prepared to use whatever means they have available to
do so. American history is replete with government attempts to
sanction or harass its critics through such diverse means as
lawmaking, prosecutions, and hiring or firing staff.
Another possible threat to the First Amendment may come
from factions or well-organized groups within American society.
Such groups may threaten First Amendment freedoms in their
quest to consolidate their power, politically and socially, within
American society.
Yet another possible threat to the First Amendment may
come from the public. A majority of Americans, at any given
time, may not want to be exposed to ideas or language that
they dislike. Many people tend not to want to listen to criticism
or contrary opinions, and people generally do not like to be exposed to expression or activity they find offensive. Many people
may even support sacrificing some of their own freedoms for
the sake of protecting national security. Thus, citizens may
urge their leaders to take certain action or support action taken
by their leaders to suppress expression with which they disagree or find offensive or threatening.
Neither Lessig nor Starr directly focuses on threats to First
Amendment interests by the government or the public. Each
focuses of course on another potential threat--corporations interested in preserving, if not expanding, their economic
power.10 1 This threat differs from other possible threats to the
First Amendment in terms of both its nature and its mechanics. Lessig suggests that four forces constrain social behavior:
law, social norms (a community's informal understandings or
traditions), architecture (the physical world around us), and the
market. 10 2 Public and private actors tend to constrain social
behavior through each of these forces. Like the public, corporations wield no formal governmental powers and are incapable
of state action which is subject to constitutional constraints.
101.
102.

See supraPart I.
See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 121-22.
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Thus, the Constitution does not apply to private business. Yet,
also like the public, corporations may not wield power by passing or making laws. They influence or coerce behavior through
norms, architecture, and the market.
Moreover, corporations cultivate enough political and economic power to pressure government officials to adopt their policy preferences. What corporations do in the private sector, of
course, does not violate the First Amendment in any formal
way, but corporations do take actions with consequences in the
public sector. They may use state and federal courts to protect
their interests, and they may lobby (and provide financial support for) public officials to enact the laws that they prefer. Further, corporations often sponsor and otherwise engage in public
discourse that can influence or shape social norms. A dramatic
example is the gun industry. Manufacturers and distributors of
guns purchase advertisements and even sponsor magazines
that express their support for (and their reasons for supporting)
the rights of citizens to own guns as provided for in the Second
Amendment. 103 With the help of the National Rifle Association
(NRA), they lobby federal and state authorities to take actions
to preserve their Second Amendment freedoms (as, of course,
they understand them), they sponsor academic research (that
supports their interests), they contribute (through political action committees) to candidates who agree with their views, and
they pay for advertisements for the candidates they support
and against the candidates who they believe threaten their
10 4
These actions, singly and collecconstitutional entitlements.
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103. The Second Amendment provides, "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
104. See Analysis: What Is the NRA?, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co/uk/
1/hi/worldlamericas/332555.stm (Mar. 1, 2000); Ashcroft's Ammo: NRA Spends
PUBLIC CITIZEN, at http:/www.
Almost $300,000 To Support Missouri2Senator,
5
citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID= 0 (Nov. 3, 2000).
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government can do about this chilling effect; it is a function of
economic power.
As one shifts attention to the domain of intellectual property, corporations have all the means (and more) that the gun
lobby and the NRA have at their disposal to protect their interests. While corporations do not wield any official powers over
freedom of speech or the press, they nonetheless take actions
that have ramifications for the quality, quantity, and diversity
of political expression.
Lessig and Starr document the actual harms that corporations can impose upon First Amendment interests in their efforts to dominate the realms of intellectual property and mass
communications. Since a threat is only meaningful to the extent that it poses a genuine or realistic harm, the first thing to
do is to see which, if any, of the harms to First Amendment interests the author identifies is genuine. It is especially illuminating to compare the developments in intellectual property
and mass media law that they both discuss to determine which,
if either, scholar makes the more convincing case for the possible harm they posed.
A. PROVING THE Loss IN CREATIVITY
As we have seen, a major purpose of Lessig's book is to
make amends for losing the Eldred case, a loss he attributes to
his failure to convince the Court of the genuine economic harm
of endless extensions of copyright.10 5 From Lessig's perspective,
the costs of copyright extension are significant, and the benefits
are slim. 10 6 It is unclear how much more creative work would

be produced if people knew that they, as well as their heirs,
would benefit economically from the copyrights they owned.
The possible benefits hardly outweigh the costs, for copyright
extensions not only artificially raise consumer costs but also
have the effects of reducing innovations. Reducing innovations
undoubtedly poses a serious threat to the national economy.
According to Lessig, endless or excessively long copyrights
force new creators to pay the second- and third-generation offspring of the original innovators for the use of work that the recipients of these payments did not help to create.1 07 The Copyright Term Extension Act covers all creative work product,
105.
106.
107.

See Lessig, supra note 2, at 228-46.
See id. at 221-28.
See id. at 135.
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108
regardless of whether it has retained its commercial appeal.
Such extensive coverage forces today's innovators to determine
who owns those rights to negotiate with them, and maybe even
to take out expensive insurance to protect themselves in case
they make mistakes in the process. To do all this is time consuming and expensive when would-be innovators are dealing
with famous artists and authors, but the problem is even worse
when the former has to find relatives of obscure or unknown
creators. These transaction costs raise the price of innovation,
sometimes prohibitively. Moreover, there are cultural costs to
extensive copyright terms. Rights holders not only set a price
for the use of the creations they control, but they also get to decide who uses them and how. By controlling such decisions,
they are able to skew the nature of what is actually produced.
Excessive copyright protections increase the likelihood that the
only derivative works produced are those that please the copyright holders. Thus, permission, Lessig notes, "is not often
10 9
granted to the critical or the independent."' In addition, limiting the public domain-the inevitable consequence of copyright
extensions-limits the range and depth of content available. If
the public domain were to shrink, then, as Intel argued in its
amicus brief in Eldred, "the need and demand for a full range
of new technologies and innovation will also decline. One cannot exist without the other." 1 0
No one knows whether the economic arguments Lessig
makes in his book would have convinced the Supreme Court to
strike down the Copyright Term Extension Act. It is possible
that a majority of the Court would have rejected his claims as
purely speculative. Lessig cannot say precisely-indeed, he
does not say in his book-just how much creativity has been
lost because of the Copyright Term Extension Act. Perhaps just
as bad for Lessig, none of his horror stories of copyright abuses
seems to match the injustices of the past that both he and Starr
document. Starr cites no modern example of corporate harassment that quite matches the injustices of the London booksellers' monopolization of the printed word in the seventeenth century,"' Edison's combative litigiousness in enforcing his

108. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
109. LESSIG, supranote 2, at 10.
110. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corp. at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
111. STARR, supra note 5, at 33-35.
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patents on the movie camera, 112 the resistance of sheet-music
publishers to the player piano, 113 the decades of suppression of
FM radio, 114 and the ironclad control of the movie and record
businesses by just a few companies from the 1920s until after
the Second World War. 115 This is not to say that the Copyright
Term Extension Act is problem free; it has produced problems,
but none seems to be as serious or as consequential as those
posed in less regulated eras.
Another problem impeding Lessig's demonstration of the
economic harm from endless copyrights is that the current
state of the law allows for considerably greater creativity than
Lessig acknowledges. This undercuts his claim that "Never in
our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
development of our culture than now."'1 6 Today's technology
has made innovators much freer than ever before to devise and
to distribute original works. Moreover, "fair use" exceptions in
existing copyright law are so expansive that just about the only
thing that people bent on stealing copyrighted work may not do
is directly copy and pass off a sizeable portion of the copyrighted work as their own. 117 Nor does Lessig once mention
iTunes or the numerous other services for legally downloading
music on the Internet. Nor, for that matter, does Lessig discuss
the legal significance of the movie industry's efforts to overcome
the piracy problem with MovieLink, by selling content over
P2P, or programs allowing people to sample copyrighted content in their own creations.
There are several other reasons why Lessig may have overstated the harm of endless copyright extensions. First, the
fragmentation of the media has arguably occurred much faster
than did its consolidation, resulting in less market power not
more. The same is true with respect to copyright law and
changes in technology: the advent of new technologies means
that intellectual property regulation covers some things that it
did not cover before, but the realm of free and unregulated ac-

112. Id. at 302-05.
113. Id. at 303.
114. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 3-7.
115. See STARR, supra note 5, at 319-20.
116. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 170 (emphasis omitted).
117. See Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatizationin Copyright, 35
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 61-63 (1998) (listing the factual differences between
cases in which copyrighted material was permitted to be utilized under the
fair use doctrine and cases in which it was not).

2005]

BIGGEST THREAT

1819

the extivity-as Lessig himself documents when he describes
118
plosion of the "blogs"-has grown much more quickly.
Second, the consolidation of the media has unintended consequences. The relative uniformity in the reporting and programming of the national media has generated the need for alternative outlets. Almost every medium has competition. For
instance, satellite radio offers a potentially significant alternative (arguably assisted by shock jock Howard Stern's impending
move there) to the AM and FM radio networks dominated by a
few companies, while cable and Direct TV offer much broader
choices for viewers than the three major television networks on
broadcast television. And of course DVD players and TiVO offer
additional alternatives to cable and Direct TV (not to mention
Blockbuster).
Third, the consolidation and integration of the media may
not be as bad as Lessig (or Starr, for that matter) suggests. By
Lessig's own count, there are thirty-eight major media voices,
and his count does not include satellite and terrestrial radio,
television broadcasters, cable programmers, and Internet content providers.
Fourth, Lessig cannot avoid at least some responsibility for
the harm he claims to have found. I have suggested that possibly his biggest error was deciding not to take his case first to
Congress. Eldred was the first time the Court ever considered
"whether extending the duration of existing copyrights complies with the 'limited [t]imes' prescription" in the Progress
Clause. 11 9 In upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act, the
Court has effectively empowered Congress to do precisely what
troubles Lessig. Before the Court took the case, no one knew for
sure whether Congress had this power. Now, thanks to Lessig's
loss, no one can seriously doubt that Congress has this power.
As any experienced litigator will tell you, the risk in taking
your case to court is that you might lose; and if you are litigating a constitutional matter the loss will be permanent unless
the Court reverses itself or the Constitution is amended. Even
if Lessig had gone first to Congress and lost, he could have
stopped there. In so doing he would have allowed himself or
others the chance to go back again without unintentionally
helping to entrench a ruling upholding unlimited congressional
power as a part of American constitutional law.
118. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 42-45.
119. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202 (2003).
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B. THE DIMINUTION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Lessig's account of the rise of contemporary corporate ownership of the media is a tale of woe, and Starr's story often
matches its despair. In particular, Starr draws two significant
lessons from historical events that have clear implications both
for Lessig's analysis and for contemporary mass communications.
The first lesson, to be sure, is rather dire: only people or
companies with substantial capital have the means to have a
meaningful impact on mass communications in the contemporary United States. It is this fact that leads Starr to end his
book with a pessimistic question: "[Have] the commercially
driven media and new techniques of mass persuasion so distort[ed] public knowledge and degrade[d] public discussion as
to make popular self-government impossible?"'120
Although most research on this question yields ambiguous
or mixed results, it is clear that mass media has ultimately
been better at reaffirming existing power relations than at
challenging them. As early as the 1940s, Paul Lazarsfeld announced that radio listeners were not brainwashed by media
messages, but merely confirmed in their existing prejudices. 121
As Starr points out, neither Lazarsfeld nor any other media researchers took into account the "'agenda-setting' function of the
media... [T]he media could not tell people what to think but
strongly affected what they thought about."'122 While "the media
would likely have a much larger effect on public opinion"'123
with respect to matters on which people did not have strong or
well-fixed feelings, its impact was "filtered through the honey124
comb of social relations."'
Since the 1920s, national advertising has supported the
rise of corporate media. 125 With that rise, we have seen a
steady "narrowing of ideological diversity" in the public sector. 126 The change is not due to technology, Starr insists, but
rather to the consolidation of ownership of the media in just a
few companies:
120.
121.

MAKES
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

STARR, supra note 5, at 388.
PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER

UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 125 (1944).
STARR, supra note 5, at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
See id. at 363.
Id. at 399.
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Before World War I, movies varied widely in viewpoint. With rising
costs in the 1920s ... the movies came under the control of a small
number of large firms that dominated the entire industry from production to exhibition, and the next decade the industry succumbed to
pressure to censor itself according to the Production Code. By the
1930s, broadcasting had followed the same course as the movies in going from an early pluralism to7 corporate consolidation and a narrowing of ideological boundaries.12

For Starr, this transformation in the media imperiled the
Founders' republican rationale for a free press-the need for
open debate among an informed citizenry. The ascendance of
film and broadcast journalism over print raised new entry-level
costs for entrepreneurs. This created opportunities for large
corporations to squeeze small operators, consolidate monopoly
power, and sustain profits by selling airtime to advertising
agencies-who in turn standardized the entertainment and the
news to provide the most effective vehicle for selling their
products.
Even worse, the public has few places to go for genuine
news. Studies conducted within the past few years show an increasing trend among the media to report not hard news-facts
and figures-but rather soft news, which consists of speculation
and commentary. 128 The harm is the disintegration of public
discourse. This phenomenon was apparent, for instance,
throughout the coverage of the 2004 presidential election. After
the third presidential debate, the media focused less on the
substantive arguments and assertions made by the major candidates but rather on the wisdom and the fallout from Senator
John Kerry's reference to the vice president's daughter as a
lesbian. 129 Though she is, the news coverage focused on the
propriety, not the accuracy, of the reference.
This is, as I say, discouraging, but it is hardly the full
story. Starr cautions his readers to keep another dynamic in
mind. In its early stages, each form of mass communication was
dominated by a single company or an oligarchy. But over time
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Survey Report, Pew Research Center for People and the
Press, How Journalists See Journalists in 2004, at 9-10, available at http:/!
people-press.org/reports/pdf/214.pdf (May 23, 2004) (finding that 78% of national news media personnel think not enough attention is paid to complex issues and that 64% think that the distinction between reporting and commentary has been blurred).
129. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, For Kerry, a Few Words That May Be Debatable, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2004, at A14; Joan Vennochi, The Low Road to
the White House, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2004, at A23.
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the company's or oligarchy's domination lapsed. One reason is
that the
United States consistently barred organizations controlling a dominant network from extending their power to a newly emerging one.
Congress declined to give the Post Office permanent control of the
telegraph in 1846. Western Union lost control of the telephone in
1879, and a federal antitrust suit forced AT&T to separate itself from
Western Union in 1913.... [W]hile allowing a high level of concentrated ownership within any mode of communications, American pol130
icy consistently favored "intermodal" competition.

Fostering such competition helped to preclude "legacy" institutions (those already dominant in one communication field) from
controlling "new media." 131 Moreover, the "trust" that dominated the movie industry in the early twentieth century
followed a conservative, risk-averse strategy, attempting to maintain
not only its monopoly power but also the motion-picture business as it
had evolved up to 1908, while the independents were more willing to
make high-risk investments in pursuit of an enlarged audience that
32
only a more ambitious conception of motion pictures could create.

In the early twentieth century, more creative and less risk-.
averse firms entered the movie industry and secured a significant portion of the market.
Starr acknowledges that American antitrust law and liberal constitutionalism have hugely impacted the evolution of
mass communications in this country. First, antitrust law has
put pressure on companies to do research to make innovations
and maintain their competitive edge. 133 In fact, some companies failed to maintain control of their fields because they made
bad business decisions, particularly by over-investing in the
wrong technology.1 34 Consequently, they lacked the resources
(and the will) to develop newer, more superior technology. New
technology gave its owners an upper hand in the market, and
the way to develop new technology was to do research. The better the research, the greater the opportunities it promised for
those doing it. Patent law protected many new innovations and
helped to sink the companies that had neither made nor bought
them.
Secondly, the nation's (including the Supreme Court's)
commitment to freedom of the press ensured a "decentralized"

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

STARR, supra note 5, at 393-94.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 337-39.
Id. at 337-38 (citing AT&T as an example).
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press less driven by the need to increase its market share. 135
This commitment prevented time and time again government
efforts to impose special taxes on newspapers and other media
outlets. The question considered in Part III is whether the
freedom secured by certain constitutional commitments allowed
forces besides the government to damage the very values that
those commitments were made to protect.
III. PROVING CAUSAL CONNECTION
The second requirement for demonstrating a genuine
threat to the First Amendment that Lessig and Starr have to
fulfill is establishing the requisite causal connection between
the consolidation of corporate control of the media and the
harm to First Amendment issues of greatest concern to each of
them-the diminution of creativity for Lessig and the compromising of the press's ability to keep the national government in
check for Starr. A problem for both Lessig and Starr is that
corporate control of the media does not necessarily produce any
harm, given that the corporations in control of the media have
some incentives to promote quality in news coverage. The drive
to maximize profits may be more of a problem, because it might
depend on satisfying audiences who want to be entertained.
Moreover, neither Lessig nor Starr discusses a number of other
possible causes for the harms they identify as well as the other
harms resulting from the causes on which they have each focused.
A. THE REASONS FOR LOST CREATIVITY

While it is far from clear how much creativity has actually
been lost as a result of the consolidation of corporate ownership
of the media, Lessig identifies an inherent tension in information technology that is impossible to deny: technological innovations have increased the ability of people to do more, but the
law has increasingly restricted what people may do with other
people's work. 136 It is easy to see why this tension is likely to
produce precisely the kinds of horror stories that Lessig discusses throughout his book. One can imagine further that the
law provides the means for corporations to protect their corporate assets (including copyright interests) against not only rela135.

See id. at 376-82.

136.

See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 184-99 (explaining how the law con-

strains both creators and innovators).
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tively powerless citizens but also against other corporations.
And this is what we see. It is not an accident that intellectual
property is the fastest growing field in the law. Both copyright
litigation and the need for licensing are on the rise. New or
smaller businesses and individual citizens with limited means
face the stiffest challenges in creating new things. Licensing
does not always come cheap, and the costs for legal representation are almost always high. In practice, this means that larger
businesses, or wealthier individuals, have an edge in creating
new things: they can bear the costs of creation better than
smaller companies or relatively poor entrepreneurs, they can do
the due diligence in obtaining all of the licensing necessary to
do business, and they have the economic resources to cover
whatever legal (and other) expenses are required for them to do
so and to stay in business.
There are, however, at least four things missing from this
picture. First, Lessig never demonstrates how corporate interests control Congress or the Supreme Court. He infers from the
fact that Disney and other large corporations donate a lot of
money to political candidates that these corporations must then
control the lawmaking process. 137 No doubt, we ought to be concerned about the fact that the people and companies that contribute the most money to candidates appear to have special, or
greater, access to those candidates once elected. It is also likely
that they are at least sometimes able to use their access (and
past support) to get favorable policies or treatment. An obvious
example is the Bush administration apparently allowing energy companies the opportunity to participate in formulating
its energy policies and even copying word-for-word (possibly
technically violating copyright law) their specific policy recommendations. 138 But it does not necessarily follow that this ac137. See id. at 216-18.
138. See Natural Resources Defense Council, The Cheney Energy Task
Force, at http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/tfinx.asp (last revised Apr.
5, 2004), and at http://www.nrdc.orglair/energy/taskforce/docl2l.html(last revised Apr. 5, 2004) (revealing in the records of the Bush Administration Energy Task Force a March 2001 e-mail message from the American Petroleum
Institute (API) containing recommendations on national energy policy). Compare Records of the Bush Administration Energy Task Force, 121, 14042, available at http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/doc.121.html (Mar.
2002), with Exec. Order No. 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,355 (May 22, 2001) (illustrating that the Executive Order contains API's recommended requirement
that federal agencies enacting significant energy action shall prepare a detailed statement concerning adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or
use).
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cess always works to the advantages of those owning copyright
interests. It is possible that many members of Congress might
have supported the Copyright Term Extension Act because
some of their biggest donors wanted it, but they also might
have supported the extension of the Act for other reasons. They
might even have figured that advancements in technology
posed increased threats to copyright owners. Since everyone
has a copyright in his or her own work, the extension ought to
work to the advantage of all copyright holders, no matter how
big or how wealthy.
Second, Lessig fails to show convincingly that corporate interests controlled the outcome in Eldred. The fact that Lessig
had to show economic harm to convince the Court to overturn
the Copyright Term Extension Act makes perfect sense. It is
unlikely the Court would, or should, be disposed to strike down
a law solely for abstract reasons. The only time this ever seems
to make sense is in the realm of the First Amendment, and
even then the Court is careful in certain cases to consider the
substantial overbreadth of a statute in assessing its compatibility with the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amend39
ment.1
Moreover, Lessig's textual argument was hardly as strong
as he believed. Granted, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to protect copyrights with "limited terms," but each congressional enactment extending the protection accorded to
copyrights is, by definition, only for "limited terms."140 "Limited
terms" does not mean that Congress is restricted to protecting
copyrights for only one or a few limited terms. A reasonable
construction is that it allows Congress to determine the extent
and the number of limited terms. The Copyright Term Extension Act may not be wise policy and may even reflect the possibility of endless extensions, but this possibility is just that; it is
nothing more than the potential-not yet realized-for Congress to extend copyright interests forever. Even after Eldred,
Lessig remains free to persuade a majority in the House and
the Senate, as well as the president, on the need to revise copyright law as he would prefer. The failure to adopt his preferred
reform, however, would not be unconstitutional.
The third problem with Lessig's perspective is his supposition that one needs to be aware of the intricacies of intellectual

139.

See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973).

140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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property law to comply with it. To be sure, most people probably have no idea what copyright law protects or allows. For instance, only intellectual property lawyers are likely to know the
exceptions to copyright protection. If you knew that most works
created before 1923 were unprotected by copyright law, you
would then know from which works you could borrow without
14 1
getting permission.
But if you also knew that it is wrong to "borrow" (directly
copy) another person's work product, you would probably know
when you needed to get permission requests. One does not have
to be an expert in copyright law to know that stealing someone's work-in whatever form-is stealing. Copyright law restricts what can be done with someone else's creations. A major
problem with copyright law is not the law but people's apparent
indifference to stealing other people's work. Lessig worries
about the barriers that corporations have established to protect
their own intellectual property, but he fails to explore more
deeply the questions of who is doing the plundering and why.
Statistics are striking, particularly in our schools, where
students, contrary to honor codes and the Ten Commandments,
come close to routinely stealing other people's work. 142 A study
by the well-respected Josephson Institute reported that 35% of
public high school students, 35% of private religious high school
students, and 27% of private nonreligious high school students,
have all copied an Internet document for a classroom assignment at least once. 1 43 Even worse, the same survey showed
that, in 2004, 61% of public high school students, 66% of students in private religious high schools, and 46% of students in
private nonreligious high schools, acknowledged cheating at
least once on a test at school. 144 The survey further showed that
83% of students acknowledged copying another student's
homework at least once. 145 These statistics are disheartening.
They show a younger generation already demonstrating dis141. See M. Scott McBride, Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Protection, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1331, 1346 n.100 (2002).
142. See generally Press Release, Josephson Institute of Ethics, 2004 Report Card: The Ethics of American Youth, at http://josephsoninstitute.org/
Survey2004 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (reporting high percentages of students
copying other people's work).
143. Report, Josephson Institute of Ethics, 2004 Report Card: The Ethics of
Youth, at http://www.josephsoninstitute.org/Survey2004/dataAmerican
tables_2004_behavior.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
144. Id.
145. Id.

20051

BIGGEST THREAT

1827

dain for a basic principle of intellectual property law-not to
steal another person's work product.
It is not, however, just students who steal; sometimes people who should know better borrow without permission. Within
the past year, a number of high-profile people have been
charged with stealing other people's works-two were eminent
professors at the nation's most prestigious university 146 while
another was the author of a highly acclaimed play on Broadway. 147 In another case, a renowned architect has been charged
with stealing one of his graduate student's designs and using it
in his design for the memorial being built in the space once occupied by the World Trade Center. 148 In yet another disturbing
case, the chairman of the Board of Education of Orange
County, North Carolina, resigned after it was revealed that he
had given a speech written and previously delivered by someone else. 149 Presumably, these people all should have known
better. Each should have appreciated and internalized the importance of not stealing other people's written work. Lessig's
book does not purport to answer this problem. At some point
(and Lessig does admit this), copyright law's basic purpose
makes sense: it exists to punish people for stealing other people's creations. Sometimes the thefts (as with the Bush administration's use of policy memoranda submitted by corporate officials) may be so trivial as not to merit any legal action, while
sometimes litigation is necessary to sanction the breach and to
recompense the losses.
B. EXPLAINING THE DEVOLUTION OF THE FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS
For Starr, the First Amendment harm of greatest concern
is the diminution of an independent press that is dedicated to
checking government abuse and maintaining a high quality of
146. Nick Klagge, Barnard Addresses Plagiarism with Website Subscription, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, http://www.columbiaspectator.com/vnews/display.
v/ART/2004/12/07/4lb54bcdb6ba?inarchive=l (Dec. 7, 2004) (recounting how
Harvard Law Professors Charles Ogletree and Laurence Tribe both admitted
to plagiarism, within two weeks of each other).
147. See Malcolm Gladwell, Something Borrowed, THE NEW YORKER, Nov.
22, 2004, at 40.
148. Yassmin Sadeghi, Alum Alleges Stolen Design, YALE DAILY NEWS,
http://www.yaledailynews.comarticle.asp?AID=27255 (Nov. 10, 2004).
149. Darla Miles, Orange Co. School Board Chairman Resigns After Plagiarism Scandal, ABC 11 EYEWITNESS NEWS, at http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/
news/060804_NWkeithcook.html (June 8, 2004).
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public discourse. The primary cause of this harm, in his judgment, is corporate domination of the media. He finds the seeds
for the current problem sewn in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and he is not optimistic about the chances of salvaging the constitutional ideal of freedom of the press. He believes that corporate dominance of the media has become more
entrenched than ever before and that antitrust litigation alone
cannot topple corporate dominance. 150 Moreover, the impediments to entry into the market are quite high because of the
enormous economies of scale required to compete nationally in
the media. With entry into the market so difficult, it can no
longer be as hospitable to innovation as Starr suggests it was
during the first half of the twentieth century. 15 1 For the few
corporations already dominant in the marketplace, the incentives are to stifle further competition and to attract and maintain a firm grip on a market share. These incentives are a big
part of the problem, for they compel the corporations in control
of the media to make news coverage profitable. News is not
profitable when it is boring or merely reports stale facts. News
is profitable when it is entertaining or, as Starr suggests, when
it reinforces what the audience already knows or believes. 152
Fox, for instance, can declare itself "fair and balanced" not because it truly is balanced but because its viewers are inclined to
1 53
believe that it is.

Interestingly, Starr's analysis leads him to bolster Lessig's
case. The ownership of the media by just a few large companies
comes at the expense of squelching originality. "[Ejntrepreneurial activity expands the scale and scope of the public sphere, extending its known frontiers."'154 According to Starr, it is the
market that stimulates innovation:
Sometimes even a single influential work.., can give a latent
public its voice and bring it into full awareness of itself. The discovery
of a new market may thereby trigger public (and private) selfdiscovery and alter what politics is about.... More amply capitalized
organizations are better able to assume [the] kind of risk [necessary
for innovation]-and are far more likely to do so in a legal environ-

150. See STARR, supra note 5, at 384 (arguing that the "system of power" in
place in the media is inescapable).
151. See id. at 347-63.
152. Id. at 398.
153. Lisa de Moraes, Three Little Words: Fox News Sues, WASH. POST, Aug.
12, 2003, at C7 (reporting that Fox News filed a suit for trademark infringement for the use of the words "fair and balanced").
154. STARR, supra note 5, at 401.

2005]

BIGGEST THREAT

1829

ment that protects free expression. Moreover, the growth of markets
does not extinguish noncommercial interests in culture and public
life. The market, even when its products are distasteful, is a continual
stimulus to innovation outside the market and in reaction to it. In a
dynamic sense, markets in liberal societies enrich the public sphere
far more than they impoverish it.155

The problem is that "[if] all were left to the market-if government had not promoted communications networks, the press,
education, and innovation while attempting to check tendencies
of power-the public sphere
toward excessive concentrations
156
would be poor indeed."
Starr is not alone in reaching this conclusion, and there is
ample data from respected sources demonstrating the diminution of the quality of news reporting. 157 The problem for Starr,
however, is that the diminution of the quality of news reporting
may not be attributable to the number of corporations in control of the media but rather their economic incentives or other
factors. David Anderson suggests, for example, that a major
problem with mass communications today is that it might no
longer make any sense to talk about "the press" as an institution worthy of its protection at the constitutional level. 158 The
problem, in his judgment, is that it makes no sense to give organizations the protections of the First Amendment if they do
not perform the traditional function of the press. 59 The problem is compounded by the fact that news organizations are operated by public companies, for which profitability is critical. In
another study, Cass Sunstein has suggested that a major problem with the Internet is that people do not tend to use it to discover new things or be exposed to new ideas. 16 0 Instead, people
tend to use the Internet for entertainment or to reinforce what
they already believe. Thus, people appear to be gravitating toward Web sites with viewpoints and reporting that reinforces
what they already believe and know. People do this in part because it is one way for them to keep the unwieldiness of the
155. Id. at 401.
156. Id. at 401-02.
157. See Leon Lazarus, Panels See FCC as Lax: Would-Be Reformers Decry
the Increasing Concentration of Broadcast and Print Ownership as the Senate
Prepares To Take up the Question, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2003, at 10 (elucidating
a consolidation of ownership as a cause for the decrease in the quality of journalism).
158. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 528-30
(2002).
159. See id.
160. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 51-88 (2001).
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Internet under some control. They also do it because it makes
them feel better. Most people do not like to be exposed to ideas,
arguments, or images that they find offensive, and many people
often find disagreement offensive.
While this state of affairs is hardly encouraging, it is not
the singular fault of the national media. What makes the diminution of the quality of public discourse especially troubling is
the fact that many organizations and people besides the media
are responsible. Once politicians understand (and support)
what the media does, they speak and act accordingly. They
learn not to release embarrassing information until late on Fridays after major news outlets have either completed their reports for the nightly news or produced the next morning's
newspaper. They also tend not to release embarrassing information until after they have put a team of surrogates in place
to make their case to the public through the ensuing media
coverage. Moreover, the media is geared to report something
flashy or dramatic, so candidates will struggle to say or do
something flashy or dramatic. Politicians therefore have incentives to bury embarrassing facts in otherwise boring packages.
Moreover, national political leaders and candidates have little
incentive to engage in a protracted, thoughtful, or substantive
discussion of an issue. Hence, both President Bush and Senator
Kerry avoided holding official press conferences during the
2004 presidential campaign. Each felt more comfortable speaking from prepared texts and answering questions in friendly
fora. When leaders or candidates do get pilloried, it is for their
style. Throughout the 2004 presidential campaign, for example,
Senator Kerry was often characterized in news coverage as
ponderous.
An additional reason that news coverage focuses on scandal, drama, or personalities is that the alternative may turn
people off. For instance, major news organizations devote extraordinarily little coverage to international news, except for
the Iraq War. Many people are not interested in listening to or
reading international news, because it is boring (to them) and
irrelevant (to them). Educational professionals have observed
that the American public has a limited attention span. 16 1 Of161. See, e.g., Full Committee Hearing on Intellectual Diversity Before the
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement
of Gilbert Sewall, Director, American Textbook Council), at http://help.senate.
gov/testimony/084_tes.html (testifying that publishers have been adjusting for
the shortening attention spans of readers).
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tentimes, people may not need much information to make decisions. Consider the act of channel surfing. People breeze by stations looking for something informative or entertaining. They
are not likely to dawdle on any given station; something has to
grab their attention. Consequently, small things like a candidate's expression to a staged landing of a jet plane on an aircraft carrier to celebrate the end of the Iraq War may go far in
shaping some people's attitudes or opinions.
Starr's book suggests that, at least as a comparative matter, the United States in the past had a better balance than it
does today between the economic and political activities of mass
communication firms, on the one hand, and preserving consti162
tutional values, such as freedom of the press, on the other.
No one can say-and indeed Starr does not say-that there has
ever been a perfect or ideal balance, though he suggests there
has been a better balance in the past than in recent years. This
leaves us with the question of whether we can improve the
quality of public discourse or press coverage. Would education
make a difference? Is better dialogue possible? We likely will
not achieve a better balance without better understanding
which institution(s), if any, are best able to address the diminution of creativity or public discourse in our society. I turn to
that question in the final part.
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF REFORM
The final question to consider is which institutions, if any,
have special responsibility to monitor and redress the threats of
primary concern to both Lessig and Starr. If eliminating a particular threat to the First Amendment was not possible, then
we need to consider whether the issue is not so much a threat
to the First Amendment but rather a problem with the First
Amendment. For Lessig, the challenge is to restore America's
lost tradition of balancing creativity with protecting property
rights. Starr's challenge is to find ways to restore the constitutional ideal (and tradition) of the freedom of the press. Neither
is terribly optimistic about the prospects of success. Each recognizes that reform will be difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve. Each also recognizes the limits of constitutional law
and constitutional authorities. Reducing or eliminating the
problems each identifies might require the impossible-a radi-

162.

See STARR, supra note 5, at 12-19.
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cal change in our culture's commitment to the First Amendment.
A. TURNING BACK THE CLOCK
Starr, the sociologist, recognizes better than Lessig, the legal scholar, that American intellectual property law derives its
uniqueness from a number of forces, including but not limited
to, certain constitutive choices made by government and society
over two centuries. Starr is not confident that any particular
institution has the means to redress the current threat to the
freedom of the press, because it is the consequence of a peculiar
mix of social, political, and economic forces that are not all subject to governmental control.
Interestingly, neither Lessig nor Starr seems to think making recourse to the states would do any good. Yet, one possibility ignored by Lessig in his long list of policy proposals is a uniform act that would protect copyright at the state level. It may
be that concerns about possible preemption by the federal law
would make such protection difficult if not impossible. But
state laws protect trade secrets and other business interests
without conflicting with otherwise applicable federal law. It
would be interesting to know if there is any room left for the
states to act constructively in this realm.
To be sure, Lessig proposes various remedies. "Common
sense must revolt. It must act to free culture."1 63 In general,
this means turning the clock back on legal restrictions and
learning to live with (and understand) new technologies. For
instance, to ensure that works enter the public domain more
quickly, Lessig advocates shortening copyright terms and restricting the ability of owners to renew their copyrights after a
certain period of time. Further, he suggests reinstating some
early copyright requirements that were abandoned because
they were perceived as onerous. His goal is to make databases
for people who want to create a digital library or produce a film
clip that uses clips from other movies: they will know what
works are copyrighted and who to contact for permission to use
them. Lessig also proposes narrowing the original creator's
rights over works that derive from an original, such as a movie
based on a book.164 Moreover, he explores ways to redefine the
basis of intellectual property-applauding how some rights
163. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 271.
164.

Id. at 294-96.
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holders, from the BBC to Brazilian pop musician Gilberto Gil,
are offering more flexible use of their copyrighted films, music,
165
and written words.
In addition, Lessig spells out a personal tenet with respect
to file sharing and the control of digital music: government
should not attempt to restrict the use of technology that is in
the midst of rapid change. 166 He claims that over time, more
and more people will opt to pay for music subscription services.
Until the market gets to the point at which it is more appealing
to rent than to own, Lessig endorses compulsory licensing; a
file-sharing service would track downloads and charge a fee at
the end of each month.
All of Lessig's proposals reflect that meaningful reform depends principally on motivating the American public to shape
the balance between the freedoms allowed and the limits placed
on digital reproduction. No doubt, his book is part of that effort.
Through its publication, he has gone over the heads of the
Court and Congress to try to build support from the ground up
for meaningful copyright reform.
The question remains, however, whether Lessig can persuade members of Congress of the need to enact his proposed
reforms. Thus far, he has yet to succeed. It is not unreasonable
to think his arguments may find a surprisingly sympathetic reception among Republicans in Congress. For instance, lawsuits
for copyright violations are increasing. Lessig describes the recording studios' assault on MP3.com, which launched a service
that let customers listen to songs online if they had purchased
the CDs.167 Within a year, the studios sued MP3.com into bankruptcy; one studio then purchased the remnants of the business
and, on behalf of the insolvent company, sued MP3.com's lawyers for malpractice because they had counseled that the online
listening service was lawful.' 68 Using similar tactics, other studios sued to put Napster out of business and then sued 753 illegal file sharers. 169 Recently, David Boies filed a lawsuit claim165. Id. at 270.
166. See id. at 193-98 (giving the example of Internet radio).
167. Id. at 189-93.
168. Id. at 190.
169. See Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Brought Against 753 Additional
Illegal File Sharers, Recording Industry Association of America, at http://
www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/022805.asp (Feb. 28, 2005); Napster Case, Recording Industry Association of America, at http://www.riaa.comnews/filings/
napster.asp (last visited May 6, 2005) (detailing the history and development
of the suits against Napster, Inc.).

1834

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

ing Linux open-source

[89:1798

software violates his client's copy-

right, 170 and he has launched test cases against DaimlerChrysler and AutoZone for purchasing Linux services. 171
These kinds of lawsuits ought to concern Congress, particularly its conservative members. It is likely that at least some
Republicans would be as interested in protecting businesses
promoting technological advancements as much as in protecting gun manufacturers or tobacco companies. Moreover, social
conservatives ought to be concerned not just with programs or
images they find offensive on network programming; they
should also recognize the connection between the rise in offensive mass entertainment and the expanded reach of copyright
law. It is reasonable to expect that the more powerful the entertainment industry becomes, the more likely it will influence
our culture. Any people offended by what they see on television
ought to wonder why obscene and indecent performances are
given ninety-five years of statutory protection. In addition,
capping damages for downloading ought to be an appealing issue to many members of Congress, particularly because it is a
common activity among people under forty years old.
Importantly, Congress has shown some receptivity to the
kinds of problems that bother Lessig (and many others). For instance, when the FCC issued an ill-considered decision in June
2003 that would have allowed big media to become even bigger,
members of Congress joined the public outcry against it.172 To
be sure, some of Lessig's proposals are unworkable and unappealing. Indeed, many of his proposals would consistently deny
payments to creators who have been ripped off, reward infringers, and put the United States at odds with international law.
Some of his proposals might even help big media by offering it
the chance to take material for which it once would have had to
pay. His scheme for regulating file sharing (in which owners
would be paid out of the proceeds from unspecified taxes) "to
the extent actual harm is demonstrated" is unworkable without

170. Quentin Hardy, SCO Sues IBM over Linux, FORBES.COM, at http:I
www.forbes.comlhome/2003/03/06/csqhO306unix.html (Mar. 6, 2003).
171. See Stuart Cohen, How SCO's Threats Rallied Linux, MAC NEWS
WORLD, at http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/40362.html (Feb. 8, 2005).
172. William Safire, The Great Media Gulp, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at
A33 (referring to the FCC's "Media Ownership Policy Reexamination," which
has been challenged in various federal courts); see Media Ownership Policy
Reexamination, FCC, available at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/ (June 2,
2003).

2005]

BIGGEST THREAT

1835

providing a reasonable definition of the "harm" for which there
173
could be redress.
At least one simple proposal that might help to eliminate
some of the more absurd copyright actions is to simply provide
an exception in copyright law for strictly private use. If private
use were restricted to sharing otherwise protected copyright
material only with family or perhaps only within a single
household, it might be workable. The risk of course is that if
private use were defined too broadly (as to include, for instance,
all family and friends) it might allow for a relatively significant
degree of pilfering copyrighted material when one considers its
aggregated effects. The challenge is to adopt a reasonable scope
of private use.
B. BUILDING A CULTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Lessig and Starr provide intriguing perspectives on threats
posed to the First Amendment from the top-down. The threats
each perceives are posed by powerful institutions whose business practices influence public attitudes. Curiously, neither
Lessig nor Starr discusses whether a different perspective is
possible. Neither addresses the possibility of a threat posed
from the ground rather than top segment of our society. Neither considers the possibility that people may not be as gullible
or as easily manipulated as would have to be the case for supposed threats to First Amendment values from the media to be
genuine. The question is whether threats to the First Amendment arise not only from the top-down but also from the bottom-up.
A change in perspective illuminates additional challenges
to the First Amendment that are rarely discussed as constituting serious threats either to the First Amendment or to intellectual property. Yet, they are evident in society. The first is
the ongoing movement to dismantle the FCC and particularly
the grounds for national broadcasting regulation. Indeed, the
three national networks indicated that they were seriously considering asking the Supreme Court to reconsider its unanimous
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting.174 Red Lion upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, 175 which, in a separate

173. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 300-04.
174. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Mega-Giants and
Scarcity, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 6, 2004, at 53.

175. Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 367.
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action, had been reversed by the FCC in 1985.176 Reconsidering
Red Lion is a critical step in eliminating federal authority (in
Congress or elsewhere) to regulate national broadcasting. The
reversal of Red Lion would, however, be far more harmful to
the First Amendment than maintaining the alternative. For
one thing, it would leave unchecked the political and legal developments that disturb Starr. Starr demonstrates that federal
regulations and constitutional protections have had positive
impact on First Amendment values. 177 Without federal regulation or constitutional protections, the marketplace of ideas is
left not to the courts or to Congress but rather solely to the
economic marketplace for safekeeping. Big government might
be problematic, but it is far from clear why Americans ought to
completely trust big corporations to safeguard the marketplace
of ideas.
I hasten to add that not all business is bad. Indeed, Starr's
concerns about the devolution of the freedom of the press are
not necessarily borne out by all of the evidence he amasses. Instead, the evidence appears mixed. On the one hand, it is true
that Sinclair Broadcast planned to air a pseudo-documentary
hurtful to Senator Kerry shortly before the election on its more
than sixty television stations. 178 The public outcry was so huge
that Sinclair abandoned its plans. 179 It is also true that CBS
Evening News aired, without proper vetting, a negative story
about the president's National Guard service based on evidently forged documentation.18 0 With the help of several
blogs,' 8 the public outcry against CBS Evening News's airing
of the story led CBS to order an internal investigation that concluded that the news organization had made a number of bad
judgments. The report precipitated the firings of several high-

176. Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir
1987) (per curiam).
177. See STARR, supra note 5, at 205-12 (citing telecommunications regulations as an example); id. at 274-94 (outlining a string of free speech decisions
by the Supreme Court in the first half of the century); id. at 392 (summarizing
the major developments in First Amendment values).
178. Sinclair Amends Kerry Film Plans, CBSNEWS.coM, at http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/19/politics/main650030.shtml (Oct. 20, 2004).
179. Id.
180. Jim Rutenberg & Kate Zernike, CBS Apologizes for Report on Bush
Guard Service, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at Al.
181. See Dave Eberhart, How the Blogs Torpedoed Dan Rather,
NEWSMAX.coM, at http://www.newsmax.comarchives/articles/2005/1/28/1729
43.shtml (Jan. 31, 2005).
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ranking people in the news division.' 8 2 Even before the internal
investigation had been concluded, CBS Evening News's principal anchor and editor-Dan Rather-announced an early retirement in an apparent attempt to avoid any formal repri18 3
mand or disciplining.
On the other hand, Frank Rich of the New York Times reports several disturbing incidents in which television and radio
stations have foregone some programming, including a national
broadcast of Steven Spielberg's Oscar-winning movie Saving
Private Ryan, because of possible backlash from conservative
viewers who might have been offended. 8 4 While some viewers
clearly recoil at the broadcast of a sexually suggestive scene
like Nicolette Sheridan's campy seduction of a football star as 8a5
teaser in the opening of a Monday evening NFL broadcast,
the same kinds of scenes (and even worse) are broadcast regularly on popular television shows without generating any complaints.
An additional problem with Lessig's and Starr's calls for
governmental reform is that they ignore an arguably bigger
threat to the First Amendment. Neither discusses the rise in
plagiarism in our society, particularly in our schools and colleges.' 8 6 No one knows for sure the causes of this disturbing
trend. Some may blame the media, particularly Hollywood.
Others may blame the courts for removing religion (and the
moral values associated with it) from our public schools. Others
may blame parents for neglect. Whatever the cause, the problem is clear and requires fixing.
The bottom-up perspective is also important for fashioning
an appropriate remedy to what many others believe is the biggest threat to the First Amendment-hysteria during time of
war. Geoffrey R. Stone suggests that the remedy for this is the

182. Jacques Steinberg & Bill Carter, CBS Dismisses Four over Broadcast
on Bush Service, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at Al; CBS Ousts Four for Bush
Guard Story, CBSNEWS.COM, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/l0/
nationalmain665727.shtml (Jan. 10, 2005); see also Eberhart, supra note 181.
183. See Dan Rather To Leave 'CBS Evening News,' ABC NEWS, at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=276466&page=l (Nov. 23, 2004) (relating
that CBS made no mention of the Bush National Guard scandal in announcing
Rather's decision to step down early).
184. Frank Rich, Bono's New Casualty: 'PrivateRyan,'N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2004, § 2.
185. Mike Celizic, ABC, NFL Reveal Their Hypocrisy, MSNBC.COM, at
http://www.msnbc.com/id/6505419 (Nov. 21, 2004).
186. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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cultivation of a "culture of civil liberties," including a national
commitment to honoring First Amendment values. 8 7 Stone offers a fascinating account of the evolution of constitutional doctrine on the power of the federal government to restrict First
Amendment freedoms in times of war. He concludes his survey
on the encouraging note that
the major restrictions of civil liberties of the past would be less thinkable today than they were in 1798, 1861, 1917, 1942, 1950, or 1969. In
terms of both the evolution of constitutional doctrine and the development of a national culture more attuned to civil liberties, the
188
United States has made substantial progress.

Of course, the cultivation of a culture dedicated to protecting First Amendment values is no mean feat. Arguably, the
United States has yet to achieve such a culture, although Stone
suggests it is developing in the right direction. A "culture of

civil liberties" requires that a number of elements must coexist.189 In general, Stone explains

Educational institutions, government agencies, political leaders,
foundations, the media, the legal profession, and civil liberties organizations all can help cultivate an environment in which citizens are
more informed, open-minded, skeptical, critical of their political leaders, tolerant of dissent, and protective of the freedoms of all individuals. Above all, as Judge [Learned] Hand observed, the "spirit of liberty
is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right." These are values
and capacities that can be learned, ingrained, and exercised over
time. We see this clearly today in the effort to build democracy in
Iraq. This is not a onetime event but a continuing process of reaffirmation and education.19o

Presumably, the culture Stone describes would have not just a
rational law of intellectual property but also a public committed to respecting copyright. Indeed, the creativity of concern to
Lessig and the freedom of press of concern to Starr are intertwined with the First Amendment values that can only be realized in a culture committed to civil liberties.
Precluding the losses of concern to Starr and Lessig requires a multifaceted approach from both public and private institutions. First, it depends on the courts performing their classical countermajoritarian function. They need not do this in
every case, but they need to ensure that the government satisfies the stringent constitutional requirements for regulating
otherwise protected speech in a time of war. For the courts to
187.
188.
189.
190.

STONE, supra note 9, at 537 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 533 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 537 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis, footnote, and citation omitted).
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do this, a lot depends on who the judges and justices are. Interestingly, in his narrative Stone never attaches much weight to
the composition of the Supreme Court at a given moment, 191
but its composition is inexorably connected to the outcomes it
reaches. So, we not only need courts committed to protecting
First Amendment values, but also presidents and senators
committed to appointing judges and justices with such commitments.
Second, political leaders need to be committed to respecting
First Amendment values in ways beyond appointing judges and
justices with the "right" kinds of commitments. The problem is
that we lack consensus on what the full array of those commitments are. Not everyone in Congress, nor President George W.
Bush, appears disposed to being persuaded by all of the First
Amendment arguments made by Stone, Lessig, and Starr. Most
political leaders have different ideas than these scholars about
what the First Amendment protects and does not protect. One
problem with a positive account suggesting First Amendment
doctrine is evolving in the right direction is that it presupposes
a set of easily identifiable guys who are good in perpetual combat with another set of just as easily identifiable guys who are
bad. This is a problem because our leaders are not likely to accept their portrayal as the bad guys in the story. They believe
that their construction of the First Amendment is the right one.
Indeed, some leaders even believe that people with opposing or
different views about the First Amendment are unwittingly
helping our enemies.
A society committed to First Amendment values requires,
thirdly, a change in corporate ethics. Starr demonstrates the
pull of the profit motive, particularly how it leads corporations
away from realizing the classical ideal of the freedom of the
press. 19 2 The challenge, perhaps insurmountable, is to find a
way to make respecting the First Amendment, even in wartime, a profitable enterprise. No one has yet figured out how to
do this.
Fourth, the importance of the public's commitment to First
Amendment values cannot be overstated. We cannot depend on
the Supreme Court alone to protect the First Amendment, for it
191. See, e.g., id. at 13, 49, 58, 68, 85 (referencing various Justices and decisions of the Court, but not analyzing the composition of the Court at a given
moment).
192. See STARR, supra note 5, at 395 (explaining how competition has given
the communications industry its own imperatives).
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is reluctant to interfere with military judgments, particularly
in times of war. Nor can we depend on our national political
leaders, because they are subject to majoritarian pressure and
most people tend during times of war to favor restricting civil
liberties for the sake of protecting national security. All of our
political institutions (and their leaders) have important roles to
perform in protecting the First Amendment. But they do not
operate in a vacuum. They take their orders or signals from the
American people. Hence, First Amendment freedoms depend,
for their foundation, on the American people's unwavering
commitment to maintaining the First Amendment. Without
such commitment, political authorities do not need to worry
about being held accountable for their intrusions upon the First
Amendment.
Neither Starr nor Lessig opines on whether the American
people are up to the task of providing rock-solid, consistent
support for the First Amendment. The signs are mixed. On the
one hand, the increase in plagiarism arguably reflects a failure,
perhaps at home or in school (or maybe both), in encouraging
young people to take chances and to be more creative. On the
other hand, copyright law does not necessarily represent the
restriction of creativity, while its violation does reflect the absence of it. Copyright law does not protect ideas. It does not restrict people from continuing to think freely and to build on the
ideas of others as provocatively as they like.
CONCLUSION
Lawrence Lessig and Paul Starr use different methods to
illuminate and suggest different reasons to fear the threat
posed to the First Amendment by the ownership of the media
by only a few corporations. Based largely on anecdotal evidence, Lessig argues that this phenomenon jeopardizes creativity in the United States. Based on a multidisciplinary approach, Starr worries that it has jeopardized both innovation
and an independent press. Neither Lessig nor Starr is optimistic that the risk each fears can ever be abated, though each recognizes that an appeal to the public may help to motivate
Americans to put pressure on their political leaders to restore
our free culture (whose loss Lessig mourns) and to facilitate
greater diversity in the viewpoints expressed in the national
media (whose diminution Starr mourns).
Relying on the public to restore or to maintain a culture
committed to protecting First Amendment values is risky. The
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public has long gravitated toward the news sources that either
reinforce their preexisting opinions or frame their thinking
about public issues. With more than just big business threatening the First Amendment, it is no wonder that Lessig and Starr
seem pessimistic about the chances for meaningful reform.
Without the public's firm commitment to the First Amendment,
national political leaders and the media can expect little downside to curtailing First Amendment freedoms. Moreover, our
culture has never fully and consistently been committed to
broadly interpreting the freedom of speech and press guarantees of the First Amendment. At least in times of war, courts
and other authorities have tended to favor restrictive interpretations of First Amendment guarantees. That the First
Amendment endures is a testament to its durability. But it is
also a testament to evolving notions about what the First
Amendment protects. With our national leaders and the American public never fully committed to its most robust interpretation, the First Amendment risks being the most unstable if not
most vulnerable of all our constitutional commitments, regardless of the era in which we live.

